This was a wierd season to observe, even by Juventus requirements.
Two managers — an announcement that nearly feels just like the norm fairly than the exception at this level. A squad that seemed damaged in October and useful, genuinely useful, by February. A defensive construction that opponents slowly discovered easy methods to choose aside. A striker scenario that by no means actually acquired resolved. After which, proper when it mattered most, a call that price them two spots within the desk within the span of three weeks.
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The 2025-26 Serie A marketing campaign was — to place it bluntly — an unmitigated catastrophe. Juventus completed in Europa League place after spending many of the second half of the season wanting like a top-four facet. They led the league in xGA suppression and nonetheless gave up objectives at a fee that price them factors. They discovered a system that labored, generated actual attacking menace, after which deserted it on the worst doable second.
The through-line, if there’s one, is the 2025-26 season revealed the ceiling of this squad as a lot because it revealed the constraints of the lads managing it. Igor Tudor couldn’t unlock what was there. Luciano Spalletti discovered a technique to get significantly extra out of it — after which, chasing his most popular imaginative and prescient of how the workforce ought to play, tried to evolve towards one thing the items weren’t fairly prepared for. The squad itself had structural issues that neither man might absolutely paper over.
To know how we acquired there, it helps to see the entire season without delay.
A desk evaluating 4 Juventus managers — Spalletti, Allegri, Tudor, and Motta — throughout Serie A matches from 2023/24 to 2025/26. Columns present matches performed, factors per sport, objectives, objectives towards, aim distinction, anticipated factors per sport, xG, xGA, and xGD, all on a per-match foundation.
The numbers are fairly stark while you lay them out facet by facet. Spalletti’s 29 matches produced 1.96 xG1 per sport and an xGA of simply 0.85 — an xGD of +1.11 per match. Tudor’s 17 matches (throughout the top of final season and the start of this one) inform a distinct story: 1.21 xG per sport, 0.94 xGA, an xGD of simply +0.27. The hole isn’t delicate. It’s the distinction between a workforce that appears prefer it belongs within the high 4 and a workforce that’s struggling to justify a spot in Europe.
A line chart displaying Juventus’s rolling xG and xGA per match throughout Serie A seasons from August 2023 to Could 2026. Vertical dashed traces mark managerial adjustments and vertical pink traces mark new seasons. The black line represents xG and the gold line represents xGA, with the hole between them shaded grey.
The rolling chart fills within the texture. The assault flatlines beneath Tudor within the early months — hovering round 1.2 to 1.4 xG per match — whereas the xGA creeps upward towards the top of his tenure. The transition to Spalletti after he took over in late October is seen virtually instantly within the offensive line, which begins climbing and, by February and March, reaches sustained stretches above 2.0 xG per match — numbers that will make this a safe top-four facet in most Serie A seasons. The xGA line stays impressively low all through Spalletti’s tenure proper up till the ultimate weeks, when each traces begin transferring within the improper route concurrently.
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Tudor was dismissed in late October on the again of 5 consecutive winless matches, together with two defeats. On high of the poor outcomes, the matches confirmed a decline within the underlying numbers. With the outcomes missing and there being no signal of enchancment on the horizon, the membership ran out of endurance ready for the curve to show.
The 1.21 xG per match beneath Tudor is the quantity that stands out most. It is a squad that had Kenan Yıldız, Francisco Conceição, and all returning, Dusan Vlahović has confirmed deadly when he’s match, they usually have been ready so as to add — who’d scored 15 or extra objectives in 4 straight seasons in Ligue 1 — to the combination. These are all gamers who, beneath the proper situations, are able to producing significantly extra menace than that. Regardless of the obtainable expertise, Tudor appeared to lack the tactical instruments to get the perfect out of what he had. And the longer it went on, the extra obvious that grew to become.
Spalletti got here in after a single match beneath an interim supervisor and the numbers shifted virtually instantly. However the factor that’s straightforward to overlook, and that the supervisor desk makes clear, is that Spalletti didn’t essentially change the form of the workforce. Each managers labored primarily from a 3-4-2-1 because of the stability and defensive solidarity it supplied. The distinction wasn’t the formation. It was what occurred inside it.
What Spalletti modified have been the roles gamers have been assigned. He took the identical fundamental construction and put gamers in roles that higher suited what they have been truly good at — and maybe extra importantly, he was extra deliberate about hiding what they weren’t.
Two side-by-side pitch maps displaying Francisco Conceição’s actions in 2025/26 Serie A beneath Tudor and Spalletti respectively. Every map reveals contact density as a warmth map, progressive passes as arrows, carries as dots, and take-ons as diamonds. The Spalletti panel reveals a heavier focus of exercise close to the proper facet of the opposition field.
The large forwards have been requested to function in additional harmful areas nearer to aim fairly than contributing closely to ball development from deeper zones. Conceição noticed his xG per match bounce from 0.09 beneath Tudor to 0.29 beneath Spalletti — greater than a threefold improve — and he took 63 pictures throughout 25 league matches in comparison with simply 10 in Tudor’s 6. His progressive passes per match dropped within the course of, from 13.8 to eight.6, which is the inform: he was doing much less of the connective work from deeper areas and arriving in attacking positions extra incessantly as a substitute. His touches grew to become concentrated close to the proper facet of the field, in harmful areas fairly than within the safer zones farther from aim the place he was extra usually discovered beneath Tudor. The ending wasn’t at all times there, and that’s an actual limitation, however the underlying motion profile is that of a participant deployed in a manner that genuinely suited him.
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Yıldız is a barely completely different story. Whereas he was at all times a key determine for Tudor, Spalletti opted to provide him extra accountability. Underneath Tudor, his function within the ultimate third was comparatively undefined — current and concerned, however with no clear focus. Underneath Spalletti, he was requested to do extra and given the liberty to do it: his xG per match rose from 0.13 to 0.25, his take-on makes an attempt climbed from 3.6 to five.1 per match, and his key passes elevated from 0.38 to 0.59. Crucially, he wasn’t requested to sacrifice the progressive work to get there — his progressive passes per match stayed roughly secure at 12.2 versus 13.6. He was given a extra demanding function within the ultimate third and, typically, delivered on it.
Two side-by-side pitch maps displaying Kenan Yıldız’s actions in 2025/26 Serie A beneath Tudor and Spalletti respectively. Every map reveals contact density as a warmth map, progressive passes as arrows, carries as dots, and take-ons as diamonds. The Spalletti panel reveals a extra concentrated and superior zone of exercise in comparison with Tudor’s.
Each gamers level to the identical underlying factor. When Spalletti put his greatest attackers in higher positions, higher issues occurred. That sounds apparent on reflection, however it’s value saying plainly as a result of it’s a very powerful factor that modified between the 2 managers.
Barely additional again, noticed a real revival with Spalletti on the helm. Underneath Tudor, McKennie was used as a utility tremendous sub — able to taking part in just about any place, deployed situationally fairly than in a set function. That explains his scattered contact map: it’s not a participant with no place a lot as a participant requested to fill no matter place the second required. His per-match numbers beneath Tudor (31.6 actions, 10.6 progressive passes) mirror that restricted and fragmented utilization.
Two side-by-side pitch maps displaying Weston McKennie’s actions in 2025/26 Serie A beneath Tudor and Spalletti respectively. Every map reveals contact density as a warmth map, progressive passes as arrows, carries as dots, and take-ons as diamonds. The Tudor panel reveals dispersed exercise throughout the pitch whereas the Spalletti panel reveals a extra outlined focus on the proper defensive flank.
As soon as Spalletti took over, he grew to become a real starter with an outlined function. Within the 3-4-2-1 that drove Juventus’ greatest stretch of the season, that function was primarily proper wingback — masking the flank defensively, contributing in transition. He additionally discovered time within the midfield duo, with taking up on the proper wing. His actions per match practically doubled to 65.3 and his progressive passes per match jumped to 19.4, each in step with a participant now masking an outlined space of the pitch with actual regularity fairly than floating by the center third on restricted minutes.
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And on the opposite wing, Spalletti was very cautious with how he approached his makeshift wingback. With an absence of other choices, Tudor and Spalletti have been each successfully compelled to play their standout winger — Cambiaso — as their left wingback. Sadly, regardless of the a number of methods Cambiaso contributes effectively to the squad, he lacks the tempo, positioning, and imaginative and prescient to defend adequately in such a job. Spalletti’s answer was a easy however (largely) efficient one: maintain Cambiaso deeper in possession.
Two side-by-side pitch maps displaying Andrea Cambiaso’s actions in 2025/26 Serie A beneath Tudor and Spalletti respectively. Every map reveals contact density as a warmth map, progressive passes as arrows, carries as dots, and take-ons as diamonds. The Spalletti panel reveals Cambiaso working in deeper positions with fewer take-ons and key passes than beneath Tudor.
The change had just a few advantages. In possession, it supplied one other supporting piece for a midfield that largely lacks technically expert gamers. Cambiaso is kind of efficient in possession, able to advancing the ball up the wing or by the center by passing and carrying the ball. Giving him that ball development accountability can be — at the least partially — what allowed Spalletti to have Yıldız extra engaged within the ultimate third. Whereas the Turkish winger was nonetheless answerable for serving to transfer the ball into the ultimate third, the presence of Cambiaso in deeper areas allowed him to obtain the ball larger up the pitch and likewise transfer the ball into the field.
Regardless of the change in function, Cambiaso’s general ball motion numbers throughout each managers have been remarkably secure. He averaged 26.8 progressive passes per match beneath Tudor and precisely 26.8 beneath Spalletti. He wasn’t even essentially on the ball extra — averaging 73.8 actions per match beneath Tudor to 74.7. What modified considerably have been the place his ball development occurred, alongside together with his take-on makes an attempt, which dropped from 1.83 per match beneath Tudor to 0.69 beneath Spalletti, and his key passes, which fell from 1.33 to 0.34.
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His transfer again had one other profit, although: it helped mitigate his most obtrusive weak spot. As beforehand famous, his lack of defensive expertise paired together with his common to under common tempo made his defensive restoration a problem. By holding Cambiaso additional again, Spalletti restricted the alternatives opponents needed to choose on his left wingback. In fact, he didn’t flip the faucet off utterly. As an alternative, he turned what had been a firehose into an everyday drawback. The left channel — Cambiaso’s facet — acquired extra site visitors than the league common. The suitable channel didn’t present the identical uplift. That’s not a coincidence. Groups recognized the route intentionally and went after it constantly. Managing Cambiaso’s attacking function helped. It didn’t remove a structural drawback that opponents had clearly scouted.
Two stacked pitch warmth maps displaying progressive move locations in 2025/26 Serie A. The highest map reveals all Serie A groups mixed throughout 137,997 passes, and the underside map reveals passes performed towards Juventus solely throughout 5,988 passes. The Juventus map reveals a notably larger focus of passes arriving within the left channel in comparison with the league common.
Opponents entered Juventus’ ultimate third through Cambiaso’s flank and generated 3.62 complete xG from these entries throughout the season — barely larger per entry than the proper flank, and with pictures that clustered in harmful central areas as soon as they arrived fairly than being pushed to safer large angles. The extra damning piece of proof is the progressive move vacation spot map, which compares the place groups performed progressive passes towards Juventus relative to the Serie A common.
Three side-by-side shot maps displaying opponent pictures towards Juventus in 2025/26 Serie A, break up by ultimate third entry zone. The left panel reveals pictures following entries through Cambiaso’s flank (46 pictures, 3.62 xG complete), the middle panel reveals pictures following central entries (65 pictures, 4.79 xG complete), and the proper panel reveals pictures following entries through the proper flank (45 pictures, 3.55 xG complete). Dot measurement represents xG worth.
Which brings us to the opposite obtrusive drawback on protection: the keepers. The combination xGA figures — 0.85 per match beneath Spalletti — recommend a protection working at an elite stage. And by way of limiting the standard and amount of possibilities, that’s largely correct. The extra particular drawback wasn’t his mixture efficiency. It was the sample inside it. was susceptible to mistimed lapses early in matches, conceding on pictures that arrived earlier than he was absolutely settled, and customarily steadied thereafter. That’s a specific and expensive form of unreliability. Going behind early places a workforce in a essentially completely different place than conceding the identical aim twenty minutes later, and throughout 17 matches this season, Juventus discovered themselves in that place earlier than they’d had an opportunity to determine themselves.
A dot plot displaying the PSxG distribution of all pictures on track confronted by Di Gregorio and Perin in 2025/26 Serie A. Every dot represents one shot on track, coloured gold for objectives and darkish grey for saves, plotted alongside a horizontal PSxG axis from 0.0 to 1.0.
Opponents scored on the primary shot on track Juventus confronted in 17 of 38 matches this season — a determine that sits on the 99th percentile throughout 100,000 simulations. The broader defensive image is difficult additional by what was occurring in aim. Juventus confronted 181 pictures on track throughout the season with Di Gregorio in web throughout 30 matches, conceding 25 — a save proportion of 86.2% towards a cumulative PSxG of 26.6. He saved roughly 1.56 objectives above what shot placement would predict, which is a optimistic contribution, although shut sufficient to zero that studying an excessive amount of ability into it over a single season could be a stretch. What the PSxG figures additionally present is that the pictures he confronted weren’t notably well-placed on common — his PSxG of 26.6 towards an xG of 28.2 means opponents’ shot placement was typically barely worse than what their positions urged it needs to be, which is a credit score to the defensive form fairly than something the goalkeeper did.
A scatter plot evaluating xG (probability high quality, on the x-axis) towards PSxG (shot placement high quality, on the y-axis) for first pictures on track confronted by Di Gregorio and Perin in 2025/26 Serie A. Every level represents one match, with circles for Di Gregorio and triangles for Perin, coloured gold for objectives and darkish grey for saves. A dashed diagonal line marks the place PSxG equals xG.
’s numbers throughout his eight appearances add a small footnote. He conceded 9 objectives towards a PSxG of 5.94 — 3.06 above expectation — with a save proportion of 78.6%. The pattern is simply too small to lean on closely, however the sign wasn’t encouraging. , and it’s not laborious to see why. Di Gregorio was wonderful. Higher than wonderful, within the mixture. However the sample of early lapses — conceding on first pictures at a fee that really perplexed the thoughts — meant that wonderful wasn’t sufficient. The protection in entrance of him was doing its job. The channel on the left was being exploited. The keepers have been steadying after early stumbles. All over the place you seemed, this workforce was virtually adequate, in ways in which compounded fairly than cancelled out.
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That phrase retains coming again as a result of it applies to virtually all the pieces about this season. The defensive construction was adequate — till opponents discovered the left channel and began threading passes into it intentionally. The assault was adequate — till it dried up in a very powerful matches of the season. Tudor was adequate to carry issues collectively — till it grew to become clear that he wasn’t. Spalletti was adequate to construct one thing actual — till he dismantled it on the worst doable second. Cambiaso was adequate at left wingback — till groups determined to make him the point of interest of their sport plan.
What’s left is a squad that confirmed, in its greatest stretch, that the underlying high quality is genuinely there. The numbers from November by April are the perfect Juventus have produced on this dataset beneath any supervisor. That issues. So does the truth that it led to sixth place.
Whether or not subsequent season seems to be like that November-to-April stretch or like the ultimate three weeks is the one query that issues now. The solutions are sitting within the switch window, in Spalletti’s tactical choices, and in whether or not the structural issues that have been papered over this season get addressed correctly or quietly carried ahead. This squad has a ceiling. This season proved it. Whether or not that ceiling strikes is what subsequent season is for.
1. A word on methodology: all xG figures on this piece use Opta’s native xG. That is distinct from SxG (Semperty’s xG), the recalibrated XGBoost mannequin utilized in different items on this website.